It is recognized that block-wise dependence is a key requirement for fragile watermarking schemes to thwart vector quantization attack. It has also been proved that dependence with deterministic or limited context is susceptible to transplantation attack or even simple cover-up attacks. In this work, we point out that traditional nondeterministic block-wise dependence is still vulnerable to cropping attacks and propose a 1-D neighborhood forming strategy to tackle the problem. The proposed strategy is then implemented in our new fragile watermarking scheme, which does not resort to cryptography and requires no a priori knowledge about the image for verification. To watermark the underlying image, the gray scale of each pixel is adjusted by an imperceptible quantity according to the consistency between a key-dependent binary watermark bit and the parity of a bit stream converted from the gray scales of a secrete neighborhood formed with the 1-D strategy. The watermark extraction process works exactly the same as the embedding process, and produces a difference map as output, indicating the authenticity and integrity of the image.
Introduction
Since ancient times, measures have been taken to satisfy the need for authentication of important documents and valuable art works, such as the signing and seal stamping of these items. The importance of authentication and copyright protection became more apparent and acute when history evolved into the information era in the second half of the twentieth century. The availability of powerful digital signal/image processing tools and the permeation of communication networks have made perfect digital media duplication a trivial procedure and the distribution of the duplicated materials a "cost effective" process. Therefore, image authentication and integrity verification have become an active research area in recent years.
Various types of watermarking schemes have been proposed for different applications. Commercially, for the purpose of copyright protection, the embedded watermarks are expected to survive various kinds of manipulation to some extent, provided that the altered images are still acceptable in terms of visual quality, or valuable in terms of commercial significance. Therefore, this class of watermarking schemes is typically robust [7, 8, 11] , i.e., they are trying to ignore or remain insensitive to the influence of malicious or unintended attacks. On the other hand, in medical, forensic, broadcasting, and military applications where content verification and identity authentication are much more of a concern, more emphasis is focused on the capability of the watermarking schemes to detect forgeries and impersonation. For example, the staff in a military headquarter always has to make sure that the digital images they are receiving come from the right people and the contents are original. Therefore, these types of watermarks are usually fragile and are expected to be sensitive to attacks [10, 18] or even incidental manipulations in some cases [1, 5, 9, 19] . Specifically, to be considered effective, a fragile watermarking scheme must have essential capabilities such as localizing tampering, detecting geometric transformations (e.g., scaling and cropping), removing original objects, adding foreign objects, and other image processing operations (e.g., low-pass filtering). In addition, it is more practical for a watermarking scheme to be able to verify the image authenticity and integrity without referring to the original unwatermarked images. This characteristic is commonly known as obliviousness. In most applications, it is impractical to verify and authenticate watermarked images by requiring the verifier to be in possession of the original images. In a more restrictive sense, obliviousness can also mean that no a priori knowledge, such as image index, about the image is required in the verification process.
For example, in military applications, if the verifier needs the image index/serial number for verification, the image index has to be transmitted through a secure channel.
Moreover, an effective fragile scheme should show no security gaps to various kinds of attacks, such as cover-up, transplantation [1] , and vector quantization / birthday attacks [1, 16] . Block-wise dependence is recognized as a key requirement to thwart vector quantization attacks [4-6, 9, 16] . However, it has also been proved that the dependence with deterministic or limited context is susceptible to transplantation attacks or even simple cover-up attacks. In this work, we point out that traditional nondeterministic block-wise dependence is still vulnerable to cropping attacks and propose a string-like 1-D neighborhood-forming strategy to tackle the problem. The proposed strategy is then implemented in our new fragile watermarking scheme, which does not resort to cryptography and requires no a priori knowledge about the image for verification. This work is intended to provide a secure method applicable to the areas of imaging of micro-evidence from criminal scenes, accident scene capturing for insurance and forensic purposes, medical image archiving, and military intelligence for content verification and identity authentication.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some important previous works in the field of fragile watermarks and discusses some attacks that can be mounted against them. Section 3 first points out the objectives we want to achieve in the proposed work to provide an effective scheme without the limitations of the previous works. Our scheme is then proposed and analyzed. Experiments are conducted in Section 4 to test the proposed scheme. Finally, Section 5 concludes this work.
Previous works
Before presenting solutions, we have to know what the problems are. Therefore, it is our intention to review two of the influential fragile watermarking schemes and some related works so that we can evaluate their merits and figure out their security gaps where different kinds of attacks can be mounted against them.
Among the proposed fragile watermarking techniques, the Yeung-Mintzer scheme [19] is one of the earliest and frequently cited. In [19] , the watermark is a visually significant binary logo, which is much smaller than the image to be marked and is used to form a binary image as big as the image. Watermark embedding is conducted by scanning each pixel and performing the watermark extraction function based on a look-up table generated with a secret key. If the extracted watermark bit is equal to the authentic watermark bit, the pixel is left unchanged; otherwise, the gray scale of the pixel is adjusted until the extracted watermark bit is equal to the authentic one. The elegance of this scheme resides in the way that the watermark is gracefully immersed into each pixel without intrusively placing it at a certain position. This merit influenced some interesting works later [5, 17] . Because of its pixel-wise scanning fashion, local tampering can be localized to the pixel accuracy. The pixel-wise watermarking fashion is actually a special case of the block-wise style with block size equal to 1.
However, due to the lack of interrelationship among neighboring pixels during the watermarking process, their scheme is vulnerable to cover-up attacks when there are local features surrounded by a relatively larger smooth background. For example, without knowing the secret key, a knife on the floor of a criminal scene can still be covered up by pasting a patch taken from the floor. Their scheme is also vulnerable to the Holliman-Memon counterfeiting attack [6] (also known as the vector quantization attack [16] or collage attack [4] showed that counterfeiting is possible even when the logo is unknown to the attacker provided that a larger number of images watermarked with the same key are available [4] . Another attack derived by Fridrich et al. can be mounted against Yeung-Mintzer scheme is that the look-up table and the binary logo can be inferred when the same look-up table and logo are reused for multiple images [4] .
Another well-known fragile watermarking technique is Wong's public key scheme reported in [15] . In this scheme, the gray scales of the least significant bits (LSBs) of the original image are first set to zero. Then the LSB-zeroed image is divided into blocks of the same size as that of a watermark block. The image size together with each LSB-zeroed image block is then provided as inputs to a hash function and the output together with the watermark block are subjected to an exclusive-or (XOR) operation.
The result of the XOR operation is then encrypted using a private key of the RSA public key cryptosystem and embedded in the least significant bits of the original image. To verify the integrity of the received image, it is again divided into blocks and the encrypted data embedded in the least significant bits of each block is then extracted and decrypted with a public key. Meanwhile, the LSB-zeroed version of each received However, like Yeung-Mintzer scheme, this method is also block-wise independent, and, therefore, vulnerable to cover-up attack and vector quantization. According to birthday paradox 1 [14, Appendix 8 .A], using a hash function that produces a bit string of length l, the probability of finding at least two blocks that hash to the same output is greater than 0.5 whenever roughly 2 l/2 watermarked blocks are available. Since the block size l of Wong's scheme is 64, given 2 32 blocks, vector quantization attack can be successful with relatively high probability. This is possible in the applications of medical image archiving where large image database is maintained. Moreover, the output length of the hash function sets the lower bound on the block size. Thus, the 1.The birthday paradox can be stated as follows: What is the minimum population size such that the probability that at least two of the people have the same birthday is greater than 0.5? tampering localization accuracy is limited.
To thwart vector quantization attack, Wang and Memon [16] proposed an improved version by adding an image index and a block index to the input of the hash function.
With this new version, to forge each block, the choices for the attacker are now limited to only the blocks from all authenticated images with the same block index. Adding the image index is one step further to secure the scheme against the vector quantization attack. In this case, since the image index is just like a unique serial number of the image, therefore, the vector quantization cannot succeed. However, this idea works at the expense of requiring the verifier to have the a priori knowledge about the image index, which limits its applicability to some extent. For example, an intelligence agent in a hostile area has to send the index of the image he/she wants to transmit through a secure channel to the verifier.
Recognizing the importance of establishing dependence among neighboring pixels or blocks, Li et al. proposed a scheme [9] that uses a binary feature map extracted from the underlying image as watermark. The watermark is then divided into blocks of size 32 × 16 pixels. To inter-relate the watermark blocks, the right half of each block is replaced with the right half of the next block in zigzag scanning path before encrypting and embedding into LSBs of the image. This method is effectively resistant to vector quantization and cover-up attacks and requires no a priori knowledge about the image to be watermarked. However, the accuracy of localization is limited by the block size.
Moreover, like Yeung-Mintzer and Wong's scheme, this scheme is also vulnerable to the 'transplantation attack' derived by Barreto et al. [1] . 1. Generate a key for a secure block encryption algorithm E k . Choose an integer a (a = 5) and a random walk through the a × a square (permutation of the set of integers {1, …, a 2 }).
2. The image is padded on the left edge and the upper edge by a -1 pixels with key-dependent random signal. Then, the image is scanned by rows, starting in the upper left corner, progressing to the right and down.
3. With each pixel g ij , look at the a × a square with pixels
It is the square that contains the pixel g ij at its lower right corner. Let g 1 ,…, g a×a be the gray scales of the a 2 pixels in this square in the order of the random walk generated in Step 1.
4. The gray scale g ij , is modified by going through its neighboring shades till
where L is the binary logo, E k (g 1 ,…, g a×a ) is the encrypted bit stream, and Parity is a function that returns the result of exclusive-OR of the encrypted bit stream.
To thwart the vector quantization attack, they embed the image index into the randomly chosen pixels in every block of 32 × 32 pixels. Specifically, they use a different secret key K' to choose the pixels in every block of 32 × 32 pixels and add the following constraint at image index-carrying pixels
where IB(i, j) denotes the required image index at the image index-carrying pixel (i, j).
Their scheme is immune to the transplantation attack because the block-wise dependence is non-deterministic in a sense due to the randomness in the process of ordering the a × a pixels for encryption. It also meets most of the requirements mentioned in Section 1. However, there are still some drawbacks requiring improvement:
It is not able to detect the cropping on the right and/or from the bottom of the watermarked image because, as described in Step 3, none of the pixels on the right or below the pixel to be watermarked is involved in the watermarking process. That is to say that the block-wise dependence is still deterministic in the restrict sense because the position of the dependence context is constant for all pixels. Note that the scheme can only work when the encryption in Step 4 is performed on the pixels that have been modified earlier; otherwise, the embedding side and the verifier would perform Step 4 on different data. Nothing is wrong with this requirement. We found that it is their 2-D Cartesian neighborhood forming strategy that is causing the problem. We will show, in the first part of Section 3.2, that taking a 1-D neighborhood forming strategy can eliminate this drawback.
Embedding the image index requires the verifier to have the a priori knowledge about the image index and limits the applicability of this scheme.
It uses two secrete keys, K and K'. This increases the key maintenance overhead and complicates the scheme.
Given the natures of the aforementioned attacks, the following summaries can be made.
To counter vector quantization attack, block or pixel dependence must be established.
To thwart transplantation attack, when establishing block or pixel dependence, the dependence context should not be deterministic or limited. Merely increasing the block size without involving contextual randomness sacrifices localization, but does not necessarily put up resistance to the transplantation attack.
To detect cropping on all sides of the image along any directions, the position of dependence context must be variable.
To localize tampering with high accuracy, one possible approach is to stamp the image pixel by pixel (e.g., [5] and [19] ) instead of block by block (e.g., [1] and [15] ).
To avoid limiting the applicability, a scheme should not rely on the a priori knowledge, such as image index, about the image to be watermarked.
Proposed watermarking scheme
According to the common requirements mentioned in Section 1 and the summaries made in Section 2 the proposed scheme is intended to achieve the following objectives:
Obj1. Invisibility: A watermark should not be perceptible once embedded, or it will provoke potential attackers' suspicion and attacks may follow.
Obj2. Sensitive to common signal processing operations:
Operations such as enhancement, filtering, dithering, recompression applied to the watermarked image must be detected. It is worth noting that in some commercial applications, it is desirable that the watermarking scheme is tolerant to incidental manipulations such as JPEG compression but not malicious tampering [10] [18] . However, incidental manipulations are deemed malicious in the areas of medical image archiving, imaging of micro evidence from criminal scenes, accident scene capturing for insurance and forensic purposes, and military intelligence, where the reviewed schemes are applicable. Thus sensitivity to incidental manipulations is a common feature of the reviewed schemes.
Obj3. Sensitive to forgeries and cover-up attack:
This type of manipulation includes the removal of original objects and features, the addition of foreign objects and features, etc.
Obj4. Accurate localization capability:
The detection of forgeries should be localized to high accuracy.
Obj5. Sensitive to common geometric transformations and distortions: Theses attacks
include cropping, rotation, scaling, etc.
Obj6. Resistant to vector quantization attack.

Obj7. Resistant to transplantation attack.
Obj8. Obliviousness: The scheme must be able to perform verification without the original image and other a priori knowledge about it.
Proposed algorithms
The proposed watermark embedding and extraction processes proceed in the zigzag order as shown in Figure 1 . The reason of doing so will be discussed in Section 3.2. The proposed scheme can be employed to watermark gray scale and color images. Without loss of generality, we will assume that we are working with gray scale images throughout the rest of this work. Now, let us define some symbols as follows. 
The reason why the term
is involved in Eq. (3) will be described later.
The order of the index of the watermark is circular, i.e., the next index after M-1 is 0. Thus, depending on the corresponding watermark bit, each pixel in
N r (i) may appear zero or more than zero times in N s (i).
Note that there are not enough physical pixels to form a regular neighborhood for any one of the first x pixels in the zigzag order. To solve this problem, we use the first 8 × x bits of the watermark to form x virtual pixels and attach them to the left of the upper leftmost physical pixel 0 of the image as shown in Figure 1 . Thus, the regular neighborhood N r (0)of pixel 0 consists of all the x virtual pixels. The last x -1 virtual pixels and g 0 constitute the regular neighborhood N r (1) of pixel 1, and so on.
According to the definitions of the regular and secret neighborhoods, the spatial relationship among their members is one-dimensional based on the zigzag order rather than a two-dimensional relationship based on Cartesian coordinate system. Thus, we will call them 1-D neighborhood. The idea we proposed to form the secret neighborhood is called 1-D neighborhood forming strategy. Now, the proposed watermark embedding algorithm can be described as follows.
Watermark embedding algorithm
Step Step i 2. Use a secret key to generate a binary watermark w as long as the image size M.
Step i 3. Use the first 8 × x bits of the watermark to form x integers in the range of [0, 255] -the range of gray scale.
Step i 4. Watermark the image pixel by pixel following zigzag order, i.e.,
for ( i >=0 and i <= M-1), repeat Step i 4.1 and Step i 4.2.
Step i 4.1. Form the secret neighborhood N s (i) of pixel i using 1-D neighborhood forming strategy (i.e., Eq. (3)) Step i 4.2. Adjust g i such that
where
PARITY({g i , N s (i)}) is the parity of the binary form of g i concatenated by the binary form of N s (i).
When the embedding algorithm finishes, the gray scale of each pixel is adjusted and the resultant image is the watermarked version of the original one.
For the verifier, the watermarking extraction algorithm works as follows:
Watermark extraction algorithm
Step e 1. Same as Step i 1.
Step e 2. Same as Step i 2.
Step e 3. Same as
Step i 3.
Step e 4. Extract watermark pixel by pixel following zigzag order, i.e.,
for ( i >=0 and i <= M-1), repeat
Step e 4.1 and Step e 4.2.
Step e 4.1. Same as Step i 4.1.
Step e 4.2. Create the difference map by using
If the image being verified is intact, all the pixels in the difference map will be 0, otherwise, depending on the type of manipulation performed on the watermarked image, the whole difference map or some portions of it will appear noisy.
Algorithm and Security Analyses
A. Why adopting 1-D neighborhood
The reason we adopt the string-like 1-D neighborhood forming strategy to form the secret neighborhood in zigzag scanning order in the proposed scheme is twofold.
The direction of the zigzag-scanning path is not constant. Therefore, cropping on any sides of the image along any directions will certainly cut through the neighborhoods of some pixels. As a result, those pixels with their neighborhoods broken will raise alarm by scattering noises over the spurious neighborhood on the difference map. This 1-D neighborhood forming strategy eliminates the drawback of the 2-D Cartesian neighborhood forming strategy employed in the scheme of [5] . Other types of geometric transformation, such as rotation and scaling, upset the correspondence between the Cartesian coordinates and the zigzag order of the pixels, and, thus, will be detected. Objective Obj5 is achieved.
The contextual dependence so established is not deterministic but random, so the vector quantization attack and the transplantation attack against the scheme cannot succeed. Objective Obj6 and Obj7 are achieved.
Note that there is no particular reason for choosing zigzag scanning order. Actually any scanning order including random order works equally well in the proposed scheme provided that both embedding and extraction processes follow the same order. Figure 2 shows another possible scanning order.
B. Obliviousness
According to the extraction algorithm presented in Section 3.1, neither the original image nor other extra information about it is needed in the verification process. In the even restrictive sense, no extra a priori knowledge about the watermarked image is required in the extraction process either. Objective Obj8 is achieved.
C. Thwarting even parity attack
We also noticed that replacing a gray scales of even parity (e.g., (00001111) 2 ) with any others that also have even parity (e.g., (11110000) 2 ) will pass the parity check of Eq. (4).
(Note that mounting this attack on the gray scales with odd parity will not succeed because the attacker does not know how many times each member of the regular neighborhood presents in the secret neighborhood. To thwart this even parity attack, the
D. Security strength
Provided that secret key is unknown to the opponents, the security of the proposed scheme resides in the secrecy of the watermark. There are two ways to figure it out :
( 
Results
In the following experiments, we will set the size of the 1-D neighborhood x to 128. A test image of size 256 × 256 pixels along with its watermarked version stamped with the proposed scheme are shown in Figure 3 (a) and 3(b), respectively. From Figure 3 (b) we can see that the distortion after adding the watermark is invisible. PSNR (peak signal-to-noise ratio) is as high as 51 dB. Therefore, we can claim that the objective of invisibility (Obj1) is achieved. To test the effectiveness of our scheme, some experiments are conducted as follows.
Exp 1. Low-pass filtering:
The watermarked image in Figure 3 (b) is low-pass filtered and the result is shown in Figure 4 (a). As a result, after the verification is carried out, the noisy difference map shown in Figure 4 (b) tells that the image has been tampered (Obj2 achieved).
Exp 2. Mole added:
A mole is added to Lena's cheek as shown in Figure 5 (a) and, as a result, the pixels in the difference map after the modified pixels within a distance of 128 pixels along the zigzag path become noisy (Obj3 achieved).
Indeed, from the difference map, we can only know that somewhere along the narrow stripe of noises is altered. However, recall that from Step i 4.1 of the proposed algorithm, a pixel i can influence the next 128 pixels provided that i is a member of their secret neighborhood. Therefore, the probability that the position of the first pixel with value 255 in the difference map is the position of the first pixel tampered is 0.5. The probability that the position of the first pixel with value 255 in the difference map is the position of the second pixel tampered is 0.75 (=1-0.5 2 ), and so on. That is to say that the probability of localization without error is 0.5, that with 1 pixel error is 0.75, and that with 2 pixel error is 0.875 (=1-0.5 3 ). For example, the five pixels tampered in Figure   5 there is no tampering localization error (Obj4 is achieved). This is a significant improvement over [9] and [15] , where the contextual uncertainties are as large as 32 × 16 and 8 × 8 pixels, respectively. Therefore, the whole difference map will become noisy (Obj5 achieved). 
Conclusions
The main contribution of this work is the idea of replacing the traditional 2-D Cartesian neighborhood forming strategy with the proposed 1-D neighborhood forming strategy.
This not only makes the scheme sensitive to cropping on any sides of the image but also puts up resistance to both vector quantization attack and transplantation attack. We also pointed out that 1-D neighborhood forming strategy works not only with any regular scanning orders (e.g., zigzag or spiral) but also with irregular/random scanning orders provided that the same order is followed in both the embedding and extraction processes.
The string-like 1-D neighborhood forming strategy is implemented in a novel and effective oblivious watermarking scheme for image authentication and integrity verification. The objectives set in Section 3 are all achieved by the new scheme.
Experiments have also shown that the requirements mentioned in Section 1 are met. The main features of the proposed scheme can be summarized as follows.
The spatial relationship of the pixels has been transformed from the 2-D
Cartesian coordinate system to a 1-D space to facilitate the forming of the 1-D neighborhood.
1-D neighborhood forming strategy makes the dependence context variable and allows the scheme to detect cropping on any sides of the image along any directions.
Watermarking the image pixel by pixel enables the scheme to localize tampering such as removal of original objects and addition of foreign objects to high accuracy.
High security and low computational complexity are achieved without using cryptography Neither the original image nor other a priori knowledge is required in the watermark extraction process.
Because of its fragile and sensitive nature to image manipulations, the proposed work is applicable to the areas of micro evidence imaging on criminal scenes, trusted camera, accident scene capturing for insurance and forensic purposes, medical image archiving, and military intelligence for content verification and identity authentication.
We are currently investigating the possibility of modifying this scheme so that it can be applied to the areas where incidental manipulations are acceptable.
… Figure 1 . Zig-zag scanning order for watermark embedding and extracting. Note that there are x pixels with key-dependent gray scale prefixing the upper leftmost pixel of the underlying image. In the experiments of this work, x is set to 128. showing that the image is manipulated.
